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Introduction
The search for an appropriate scheme of laws to govern medical
practice is always difficult, but never more so than in the area of
euthanasia, the "right to die," and the termination of medical treatment. By an "appropriate" scheme of law, we mean one which
protects the interests of individuals and society, while at the same
time allowing physicians sufficient freedom to practice their profession. Rapid changes in medical technology, along with the emergence
of new theories in medical ethics, have compounded the problems
faced by courts and legislatures as they address these issues. Adding to
the confusion is the multitude of interests that must be considered in
the question of when medical treatment may be terminated: those of
the patient, the family, the state, the physician and the medical institution.
The proposed solutions to these problems too often focus on one
interest to the extent of ignoring others. For example, some commentators emphasize that the interests of the family should be
paramount and urge that the broadest possible powers to terminate
medical treatment, consistent with the law, should be granted to the
family.! The danger of such an approach is illustrated in reports of
medical neglect and starvation of handicapped newborn infants, " in
accordance with the parents' wishes. " 2 These cases indicate that the
family may be incapable of voicing or protecting the interest that
society might have in the preservation of life for its handicapped, aged
or infirm members. 3 Therefore, a significant difficulty the law faces
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in resolving the tennination of treatment problems is the balancing of
the competing social and personal interests which converge in this
issue. This is particularly true when determining the rights, duties and
obligations surrounding the incompetent and children.
Despite these many hurdles, judges and legislators who have
grappled with the problem have reached a rough consensus on the
legal principles to be applied in termination of treatment cases. It is
not always easy to discern this consensus among the court opinions
and legislation of recent years, but a careful investigation reveals that
it is there, nevertheless. To understand how this consensus has come
about, it will be necessary to discuss briefly the chief legal doctrines
that come into play when a decision to continue or to discontinue
medical treatment must be made. Then, we will analyze how these
doctrines were applied in two termination of treatment decisions in
the courts of New York. Following this will be a discussion of "living
will" or "natural death" legislation that has been passed in many
states. Finally, we will take a look at some of the unanswered questions in this area, including the problems arising in the case of handicapped newborns.
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1. Basic Legal Doctrines
Concerning the Withdrawal of Medical Treatment

The Right to Refuse Treatment - Under the common law, a competent adult, as part of the right of self-determination, has a right to
refuse medical treatment.4 This is one reason why an adult patient
must give informed consent to medical treatment, such as surgery, and
why, in the case of minor children or incompetent persons, a parent or
guardian must give consent.
The right of an adult to refuse medical treatment extends even to
situations where such refusal will lead to the death of the patient. In
Satz v. Perlmutter,5 the Florida Supreme Court held that a 73-yearold patient, mortally ill from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, could
knowlingly direct his removal from a respirator, even though it was
certain that death would follow in an hour. The court found that a
patient has a right to refuse life-preserving medical treatment
especially when such treatment is extraordinary and the patient
suffers from a tenninal illness.
The right to refuse treatment, however, is not absolute. In many
instances where members of religious sects have opposed the receipt of
blood transfusions, clainiing that this medical procedure violates their
religious principles, the courts have nevertheless ordered the transfusions to be administered.6 The rationale of these decisions is that
the state interest in preserving the life of the individual outweighs the
right that the individual has to refuse life-saving medical treatment,
even on grounds of religious belief. In the case of children, the courts
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hold to the principle that a parent may not withhold from his child
emergency treatment that is necessary to save the life of the child. In
the case of adults, courts have held that the state has an additional
interest in protecting the interests of third parties, for instance, children who would be orphaned if their parents were not given
emergency life-saving treatment. 7
The Constitutional Right of Privacy - In the case of Karen Quinlan,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey found a new expression for the
right to refuse treatment. The court held that a person who is
terminally ill has a constitutional right of privacy that includes the
right to refuse extraordinary medical care. 8 The court also said that
this constitutional right must be balanced against the same state interests that are to be considered with the common law right to refuse
medical treatment, especially the interest in preserving life. 9
The court held that, in Karen's case, the state interest in preserving
life had diminished because of Karen's chronic, vegetative, comatose
condition.1° The court judged (wrongly as it turned out) that Karen
was terminally ill, and that the respirator which assisted her breathing
was merely prolonging the process of dying. Thus, the court held that
Karen would be within her rights to refuse further respirator treatment, and since she was incompetent to exercise these rights, that her
father, as guardian, could consent to a decision to remove the
respirator. The court, however, did not give Mr. Quinlan an absolute
right to direct the course of Karen's treatment, only the right to
choose which physician would be responsible for that treatment. 11
Therefore, it was assured that the ultimate decision in Karen's case
would be a medical decision, consented to by the patient's parents.
When medical practitioners withdrew the respirator from Karen, they
used a weaning process that enabled her to develop a capacity to
breathe on her own. She has thus survived for over six years, without
mechanical respiratory assistance, but still in a complJtely bed-ridden,
comatose condition.
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not clarify exactly why it was
necessary to develop a constitutional right to refuse treatment in light
of the well-established common-law right. Neither has the handful of
decisions which have adopted the doctrine of the Quinlan case. It is
significant, however, that all of these cases involved patients who were
incompetent due to a chronic comatose condition or mental disability.
The constitutional right to refuse treatment appears to have been
adopted to meet the special problems presented by these cases involving persons who cannot communicate their consent or refusal of
medical treatment. Standing alone, however, the right to privacy does
not solve the problem, for a comatose person is equally as unable to
exercise his constitutional right of privacy as he is to exercise his
common law right of self-determination. Courts have employed the
doctrine of "substituted judgment" to get around this problem.
May, 1983
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2) Substituted Judgment and Judicial Review

of Treatment Decisions
The case of Joseph Saikewicz 12 involves a 67-year-old man with an
I.Q. of 10 who had been institutionalized in Massachusetts state
hospitals throughout his life. Saikewicz was afflicted with acute
myeloblastic leukemia for which the usual treatment is chemotherapy.
The state hospital officials in charge of his case petitioned the courts
to appoint a guardian for Mr. Saikewicz. The guardian and the attending physicians recommended against the use of chemotherapy, and the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ultimately affirmed this
decision.
The Massachusetts court agreed with the Quinlan decision that the
constitutional right to privacy was applicable to this type of case.1 3
Finding that this right to refuse treatment must be available to
incompetent as well as to competent patients, the court held that the
judgment of a court-appointed guardian could be substituted for that
of the patient. In making this "substituted judgment," the guardian is
to consider the best interests of the patient and, as near as possible,
make the same decision that the incompetent patient would have
made had he or she been able to decide upon a course of treatment. 14 The Quinlan court also had adopted this approach, concluding in support of its decision that if Karen were miraculously lucid
for a moment, she would ask to be removed from her respirator. 15
The Saikewicz and Quinlan decisions are split, however, on the
question of whether court approval is necessary for a decision to
withdraw treatment. The New Jersey court said that the decision to
remove Karen's respirator could be approved by a hospital "ethics
committee," composed of physicians, administrators, clergy and lay
persons from the community.16 The Massachusetts court, however,
criticized Quinlan for allowing family and physicians to make such
decisions without court authority and explicitly stated that court
approval must be sought. 17 A year later, in the Matter of Earle Spring,
the same court explained:
[I) f the judge in such a case [is) not persuaded that the incompetent individ·
ual's choice, as determined by the substituted judgment standard, would
have been to forego potentially life-prolonging treatment, or if the interest of
the state requi~ed it, the treatment [is) to be ordered ....
[W) e disapprove shifting of the ultimate decision·making responsIbility
away from the duly·established courts of proper jurisdiction. 18

This holding has been strongly criticized as substituting the judgment
of courts for medical judgments that may only be made by a
physician. 19 Apparently sensitive to this criticism, the Massachusetts
court has stated that physicians will not automatically be liable for a
lawsuit if they withdraw treatment without judicial approval, nor will
they be automatically immune from such liability if they obtain court
approval, but carry out their actions in negligent fashion. 2o These
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remarks emphasize the fact that in treating a terminally-ill patient, a
physician remains bound by the general standards of law that govern
the practice of medicine. The new principles enunciated in opinions
such as Quinlan and Saikewicz thus represent only a portion of the
standards to which the law may hold a physician.
When Treatment. May and May Not Be Withdrawn - Courts have
generally held that treatment may be withdrawn only from patients in
a severe condition of terminal illness. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Saikewicz limited the application of the rule allowing treatment to be withdrawn to those cases where the patient has 1) an
incurable and terminal illness, and 2) where there exists no life-saving
or life-prolonging treatment or 3) where the treatment, if available,
would only effect a brief and uncertain delay in the natural death
process. 21 The court found that these criteria were met in the case of
Joseph Saikewicz since it was certain that the patient would die eventually of leukemia. The court placed special emphasis on the third
criterion listed above, noting that the initiation of chemotherapy
could bring about a temporary remission of the illness, lasting several
months to one year. Despite its potential for prolonging life, however,
chemotherapy would also bring considerable disruption and discomfort to the patient. Taking into account the patient's total inability to
comprehend or cooperate in this difficult coui:se of treatment, the
court affirmed the decision that the treatment could be withheld.
Another Massachusetts case, that of Earle Spring, involved a
77-year-old man suffering from end-stage kidney disease and chronic
organic brain syndrome (senility).22 The kidney disease required a
thrice-weekly hemodialysis treatment. Although removal from dialysis
would be fatal, the state supreme court held that the patient had a
common law and constitutional right to resist nonconsensual invasion
of his bodily integrity, a right which may be exercised by the substituted judgment of a guardian. 23 The court repeatedly characterized
Mr. Spring's disease as incurably fatal and termed the hemodialysis
life-prolonging rather than life-saving. Finding that "there was no
prospect of cure or even a recovery of competence," the court held
that the Saikewicz criteria had been met and that, with court
approval, treatment could be withdrawn. 24
A very common form of treatment withdrawal in hospitals is the
issuance of an order, " Do not resuscitate." Under a "DNR order,"
measures such as CPR, intubation and mechanical ventilation will not
be used if a patient suffers cardiac or respiratory arrest. A Massachusetts appellate court found a DNR order to be appropriate in the case
of Shirley Dinnerstein, a 67-year-old woman with Alzheimer's disease,
who had also suffered a stroke and was in an essentially vegetative
state, immobile and speechless. The opinion of the court emphasized
that the patient's prognosis was hopeless and that death must come
soon. 26 Resuscitative measures for Mrs. Dinnerstein offered no hope
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of reasonable expectation of relief or remission from the fatal illness.
Therefore, the court held in a case such as this, where the question is
what measures are appropriate to ease the imminent passing of an
irreversibly, terminally ill patient in light of her history and family
wishes, that question is not one for judicial decision, but for the
attending physician.27 Thus, according to this opinion, where death is
imminent, a DNR order may be appropriate.
In the recent case, Custody of a Minor,28 a Massachusetts appellate
court upheld a similar DNR order that was entered in the case of an
infant born with severe handicaps. This is a potentially important
development because of the fact that an infant, rather than an adult
such as Mrs. Dinnerstein, was involved. In support of its decision, the
court cited both Dinnerstein and the "substituted judgment" standard
of Saikewicz, agreeing that the parents had properly exercised judg·
ment on behalf of their child in approving the DNR order.
However, a Minnesota case illustrates that DNR orders, however
common, will meet with resistance in some cases.29 During brain surgery, Sharon Siebert, a middle-aged woman, suffered severe complications which resulted in brain damage and near-total paralysis. She was
taken to a rehabilitation center, but did not receive the medical care
indicated by her condition. For instance, three years went by in which
she was never examined by a neurologist. Her husband, a physician on
the staff of the rehabilitation center, divorced her, but continued to
pay for her care. After several years, a DNR order was given in her
case : no measures were to be used even in the event of choking, to
which, due to her paralysis, Mrs. Siebert was susceptible. A friend of
Mrs. Siebert' s, Jane Hoyt, challenged the DNR order, arguing that
since Mrs. Siebert was not terminally ill, life-support measures could
not be withheld. A state district court in Minnesota agreed.
Understandably, the consequence of these judicial opinions is often
confusion. For example, the Supreme Court of Delaware in S everns v.
Wilmington Medical Center,30 includes in its opinion a long series of
questions, such as "What is a life-sustaining system for a person who
has been comatose for many months? " 31 The court then wonders
whether food or medicines are to be considered " life-sustaining
systems." In Severns, the court ruled that the decision to withdraw a
respirator from a woman critically injured in an automobile accident
and in a chronic comatose condition should be guided by the principles set forth in Quinlan and Saikewicz. However, the court's "free
inquiry" seemed to indicate that the judges wondered whether
termination of treatment amounted to the legalization of mercykilling.
The Severns case, while not deciding any of the factual issues
involved, leaves one with the uneasy feeling that the comatose patient
now finds himself on a slippery slope, with the courts gently pushing
toward the legalization of euthanasia This is the ultimate consequence
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of an inability to distinguish the truly tenninal case in the application
of the legal principles allowing the termination of medical care. Once
termination of treatment is allowed by the courts in non terminal cases
and for other than medical reasons, the door is open to legalized
euthanasia.
This development is best illustrated by the recent case of Infant
Doe, born in Bloomington Hospital (Indiana) in April,
1982.32 Physicians diagnosed Infant Doe as afflicted with Down's
Syndrome, with additional esophageal anomalies which required corrective surgery. Despite the urgings of the child's pediatrician that the
surgery be performed immediately, the parents refused to consent to
surgery and were supported by their obstetrician and the hospital. The
child was also deprived of food and water (the esophageal fistula made
digestion impossible) or even intravenous nourishment and hydration,
and died six days later.
A circuit court judge of Monroe County, Indiana, visited the hospital on the second day of the child's life and pronounced that the
decisions to withhold surgery and nourishment were a proper exercise
of parental authority and medical judgment. The court was asked
several times to reconsider this judgment by the Monroe County
prosecutor, who brought an action under the state child abuse
statutes, and by private parties who sought to adopt the child and
order the life-saving surgery. An appeal was also taken to the Indiana
Supreme Court, but turned down in a 3-1 decision.
In fact, this child was not dying and this was not a case of tenninal
illness. There existed a frequently-performed surgical procedure which
would have been beneficial to the child. Withholding of the surgery,
and especially, of all forms of nourishment, is not supported by the
principles of the Quinlan or Saikewicz cases. Such conduct is a homicide as well as an intentional tort. (The prosecutor of ¥onroe County,
however, has decided not to press criminal charges in this matter.)
Withholding treatment in this case caused the infant's death just as
surely as would the injection of poison in its veins. This was not a
tenninal case; it was the decision to withhold the surgery and nourishment which made the case terminal. The case illustrates the danger of
legalizing euthanasia if the principles for withholding medical treatment to the incompetent are not limited to the truly terminal situation.
Other courts have made the proper distinctions and ordered beneficial treatment for infants in dangerous situations. In the Baby Houle
case,33 a Maine court was faced with a situation virtually identical to
that of Infant Doe, and appointed a guardian to give consent for the
corrective surgery against the wishes of the parents. In the Cicero
case,34 a New York court ordered corrective surgery for an infant
born with spina bifida. Pressure from federal authorities recently
brought about a similar decision, settled out of court, in the case of a
May, 1983
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spina bifida infant born in Robinson, Illinois. Finally, in the famous
Chad Green case,35 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed a
lower court decision that took custody of a 20-month-old child away
from his parents. The child suffered from leukemia, and his parents
had refused to consent to the appropriate treatment, which was
chemotherapy. In all these cases, the treatment that was ordered was
both life-prolonging and life-saving. Under these circumstances, the
state's interest in protecting · the life of the child outweighs the
parents' right to direct medical treatment.

I,

3) Applying the Legal Standards:
The Cases of Brother Fox and John Storar
One means of synthesizing the material discussed so far is to see
how legal doctrines have been applied during the course of individual
cases, and how those cases proceed through the courts. Two which
would be useful for such a study are those of Brother Joseph Charles
Fox and John Storar, both of which took place in New York. 36
Joseph Charles Fox was an 83-year-old religious brother in the
Society of Mary, residing in retirement on Long Island. During a
routine operation in October, 1979, he suffered a massive cardiopulmonary arrest. Though resuscitated by a mechanical ventilator, Brother
Fox had suffered a cessation of oxygen flow to the brain, resulting in
profound, irreversible brain damage. 37 He remained in a coma for
four months and, despite the continued assistance of the respirator,
died of congestive heart failure on Jan. 24, 1980. 38
While Brother Fox remained alive on the respirator, his religious
superiors, led by Father Philip Eichner, requested the hospital and
attending physician to authorize removal of the respirator and thus, to
let Brother Fox die without "extraordinary" medical treatment. This
request was denied, so Father Eichner petitioned a county court to be
appointed the guardian of Brother Fox with power to direct the withdrawal of the respirator. At the court hearing, Father Eichner offered
evidence of prior statements made by Brother Fox indicating that he
did not wish extraordinary means to be used to sustain his life should
he ever fall into an irreversible comatose condition. Ironically, Brother
Fox had made these statements during a discussion of Karen Quinlan's
case among his brethren. 39
The trial court ruled that these statements of Brother Fox were an
exercise of his common law right of self-determination, and should be
honored by his physicians. 4o Concluding from the medical evidence
that there was no hope for recovery or even significant improvement
in Brother Fox's condition, and that the respirator could only extend
the process of dying, the court ruled that the interests in the preservation of life would not- be compromised by the withdrawal of the
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respirator. The trial court found it unnecessary and unwise to base its
decision on the constitutional right to privacy. 41
The district-attorney of Nassau County appealed the decision allowing the respirator to be withdrawn to the appellate division of the
Nassau County Supreme Court. The appellate court affirmed the decision below, but wrote a very different type of opinion, relying primarily on the Quinlan doctrine of the constitutional right to
privacy.42 The court ruled that the right to die in dignity, without
continued use of mechanical life-support systems, was protected by
the right of privacy. Furthermore, the court held that the state interest in the preservation of life does not extend to a patient in the
condition of Brother Fox, since there is virtually no life left to
preserve. Finally, the court said that it is unnecessary that a patient
have expressed the desire to have treatment withheld; that is, if
Brother Fox had not made the statements that were so heavily relied
upon by the trial court, his constitutional right to die with dignity
could have been exercised by the substituted judgment of a courtappointed guardian. 43
The appellate division's opinion went further in terms of legal doctrine than any earlier decision in defining a specific "right to die." 44
Previously, as in the Quinlan and Saikewicz cases, the courts spoke in
terms of a right to refuse treatment, even when such treatment is
necessary to sustain life. The difference between this concept and the
"right to die" is more than semantic because, in the incremental
dynamic of development that is characteristic of the law, this small
difference opens the way for courts down the road to fashion a more
positive right to die. Such a development could bring about the legalization of euthanasia, or "mercy-killing," which is currently illegal
throughout the United States. If such a developed right to die is found
to exist under the U.S. Constitution, Wf> will be faced with the
paradox of a Constitution that includes a right to die as well as a right
to life. Furthermore, if the power over exercise of these rights in the
case of incompetent persons is given to parents and guardians. under
the principle of substituted judgment, the potential for abuse will be
enormous. This is illustrated well by the recent decision of courts in
Indiana to allow parents to withhold life-saving surgery, and even food
and water, from their newborn infant afflicted with Down's
Syndrome. 45
In recognition of this potential for abuse, the appellate division
sided with the Massachusetts courts and required that any decision to
withhold life-preserving treatment from a terminally-ill patient must
be sanctioned in a court of law. 46 The court also limited the application of the principle of substituted judgment over the right to die to
those cases where a patient is in the most grave physical condition:
"The necessary medical criteria for the activation of the patient's right
are self-apparent: he must be terminally ill; he must be in a vegetative
May, 1983
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coma characterized by the physician as "permanent," "chronic" or
"irreversible"; he must lack cognitive brain function; and the probability of his ever regaining cognitive brain function must be
extremely remote. The state's interest in protecting the sanctity of life
will tolerate no less stringent medical standard than this. 47
Thus, what the appellate division seemed to give with one hand in
creating a "right to die," it took away with the other hand by severely
limiting the application of that right. However, it decided that for the
case of Brother Fox, the necessary criteria had been met, and thus
affirmed judicial approval for the removal of the respirator. Although
Brother Fox had died by the time of the decision, the court indicated
that it intended these standards to be widely applied, and therefore,
the district attorney lodged an appeal to the court of appeals, the
state's highest bench.
In the court of appeals, the case of Brother Fox was joined with the
case of John Storar, a 56-year-old adult with a mental age of less than
two years, who had been institutionalized throughout his life in a state
hospital near Rochester.48 Storar suffered from terminal cancer and
was receiving frequent transfusions to compensate for blood loss due
to internal bleeding. His mother, who was also his court-appointed
guardian, at first consented to the transfusions, then asked that they
be discontinued out of concern for her son's comfort. 49
The hospital petitioned the Monroe County court for authority to
continue the transfusions over the objections of Mrs. Storar. At the
hearing on the petition, hospital staff members testified that Storar
would become lethargic and unable to perform his routine daily
activities without the transfusions, but that he would die despite the
continued transfusions within a matter of months. Several medical
experts testified in support of Mrs. Storar that at this stage of disease,
blood transfusions may only prolong suffering and thus may be discontinued. 50
,
The court held, following the opinion of the appellate division in
the Brother Fox case, that John Storar had a constitutional right to
refuse blood transfusions that could be exercised on his behalf by his
mother. Mrs. Storar, the court explained, was the best person to determine what John would decide if he were competent to make that
decision. 51 The appellate division of the Monroe County court summarily affirmed and the case was brought to the court of appeals. 52
The court of appeals resolved both the cases of Brother Fox and
John Storar without employing the constitutional right to privacy that
had been invoked by the lower courts, and adopted in New Jersey and
Massachusetts. In a brief opinion, the court stated that it would not
reach the question of applying the constitutional right of privacy to
the case of Brother Fox because the relief granted to Father Eichner,
the priest who brought the original suit, "is adequately supported by
common law principles." The court thus dismissed the substance of
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the opinion of the appellate division and returned to the common-law
right of self-determination that had been used by the trial court.
In the case of John Storar, the court of appeals rejected as
"unrealistic" any attempt to determine whether the patient, if he were
competent, would want the potentially life-prolonging blood transfusions discontinued. Storar, the court stated, was never competent at
any time in his life, and "totally incapable of understanding or making
a reasoned decision about medical treatment .... Mentally, John
Storar was an infant and that is the only realistic way to assess his right
in this litigation .... This case bears only superficial similarities to
[Brother Fox] and the determination must proceed from different
principles." 53
Because John Storar was an infant, the court ruled his mother could
consent to his medical treatment, but could not deprive him of lifesaving treatment. Even if a decision to withhold treatment is wellintentioned, or motivated by religious beliefs, "it must yield to the
state's interests, as parens patriae, in protecting the health and welfare
of the child." 54 This follows from the principle, discussed above,
under which courts will not allow parents to deny blood transfusions
that are necessary to save a child's life.
John Storar, the court recognized, would die eventually of cancer.
Without the blood transfusions, however, he might die sooner, and
certainly his physical condition would deteriorate more rapidly. The
court said:
[T] he transfusions were analogous to food - th ey would not cure the
cancer, but they could eliminate the risk of death from another treatable
cause. Of course, John Storar did not like them, as one might expect of one
with an infant's mentality. But the evidencl! convincingly shows that the
transfusions did not involve excessive pain and that without them his mental
and physical abilities would not be m ai ntained at the usu al level. With the
transfusions, on the other hand, he was essentially the sam as he was before
except of course he had a fatal illness which would ultimately claim his
life . ...
[A] court should not in the circumstances of this case allow an incompetent
patient to bleed to death because someone, even someone as close as a
parent or sibling, feels that this is best for one with an incurable disease. 55

The court therefore granted the petition of the hospital for authorization to continue the transfusions.
These two case histories demonstrate the variety of legal doctrines
that may be applied to the same set of facts by the courts. The
problems posed by such conflict are not severe, and the approach
followed by the court of appeals may become a model for addressing
such cases in the future. The benefit of the court's opinion is its
demonstration that principles of the common law can be used to
resolve difficult medico-legal questions rather cleanly, without the
intervention of the constitutional law and the complexity that is
inherent in applying the constitutional law doctrines.
May, 1983
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The prime example of this relative simplicity is reflected in the
court of appeals's discussion of the need for judicial approval of decisions to withdraw treatment, a step which was made mandatory under
the constitutional law approach adopted by the lower appellate
courts.
Recognizing that responsible parties may at times need clarification
of their legal rights and duties, the court stated that those in charge of
incompetent patients may apply to the courts "for a ruling on the
propriety of conduct which might seriously affect their charges." Such
a procedure, though, is entirely optional.
Neither the common law nor existing statutes require persons generally to
seek prior court assessment of conduct which may subject them to civil and
criminal liability. If it is desirable to enlarge the role of the courts in cases
involving discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment for incompetents by
establishing, as the Appellate Division suggested ... a mandatory procedure
of successive approvals by physicians, hospital personnel, relatives and the
courts, the change should come from the Legislature. 56

The New York court is not the first court to urge legislative action
in this area. In response to cases such as Quinlan, Saikewicz and
Brother Fox, legislatures in several states have passed "natural death"
or "death with dignity" laws. Although legal experts have questioned
the impact of these laws in light of the standards that have been
developed in the courts, they are necessary to a comprehensive understanding of the law of medical treatment.
4.) Legislative Approaches to
Termination of Medical Treatment
Legislative attempts to solve the termination of treatment problem
began in 1976 with the passage of the California Natural Death
Act. 57 By 1977, seven other states had passed similar legislation, 58
but since then, only four states have done SO.59 Generally speaking,
such legislation allows a person to execute a directive to his physician
for the purpose of withholding medical treatment at some later date,
usually when the patient has reached a terminal state and is unable to
exercise his right to refuse medical treatment. This legislation is not to
be confused with "definition of death" bills, which only attempt to
clarify the criteria to be used by physicians in determining when death
has occurred. 6o Although the determination of death will be related in
some cases to the decision whether artificial means of life-support may
be withdrawn, definition of death bills are only concerned with a
physician's judgment and thus say nothing regarding the power to
withdraw life-support from a patient who is clinically alive.
Most death with dignity bills declare a right to refuse life-prolonging
medical treatment, and authorize persons to execute a legal document
164

Linacre Quarterly

1
I

,I

directing that such life-support measures not be used in certain circumstances. It is intended that this directive will be binding upon the
treating physicians. This is an example of such a "living will" given in
one statute:
TO MY FAMILY, MY CLERGYMAN, MY ATTORNEY, MY PHYSICIAN :
If the time comes when I can no longer actively take part in decisions for
my own future, I intend this Declaration to stand as a statement of my
wishes.
If due to accident, disease or illness I have been reduced to a condition
whereby I am unable to indicate my wishes or choices, and there is no
ex pectation of my recovery, I request that I be allowed to die and not be
kept alive by artificial means or heroic measures. I ask also that drugs be
mercifully administered to me for terminal suffering, even if in relieving
pain they may hasten the moment of death . I highly esteem and value life
and the dignity of life, so tha t I am not asking that my li fe be directly
taken; but it is my inte ntion that, because there is no possibility of
recovery, my dying not be unreasonably prolonged nor the dignity of my
life destroyed by artificial contrivances.
This request is made, after careful reflection, while I am in good health
and spirits. I recognize that it places a h eavy burden of responsibility upon
you, a nd it is with the intention of sharing this grave responsibility with you
that this statement is made. 61

The more carefully-drafted versions of such statutes include a
proviso that nothing in the act is to be construed to condone or
authorize mercy-killing or any affirmative or deliberate act or
omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying. 62
Thus, the laws of homicide which condemn such mercy-killing by
either act or omission remain intact.
Still, there remain: some problems even with the most carefully
drafted of these statues. First, to the extent that such statutes attempt
to direct the conduct of the physician at some future date, they fail to
consider the physician's own medical judgment concerning the
appropriateness of treatment. Such legislation should provide that the
desires of the patient be expressed in a manner which will assist the
physician in handling the terminal case, without setting up a mandatory duty to withdraw treatment. Second, such legislation may
actually inhibit physicians from respecting the wishes of the majority
of terminal patients who are unlikely ever to execute a "living will."
(Experience with other forms of wills shows that a vast majority of
persons are likely never to execute a living will.) Whenever a statute. is
enacted to regulate conduct, particularly where punitive sanctions are
available for noncompliance, the effect is to chill and inhibit similar
conduct, otherwise legal, but not now in conformity with the requirements of the act. Thus, physicians may be reluctant to withdraw or
withhold life-sustaining treatment unless a directive has been executed
by the patient, even though there is no legal obligation to extend such
care (as in the case of useless life-prolonging treatment). The CaliforMay, 1983
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nia Natural Death Act attempts to get around this problem by providing that the bill does not impair any previously-existing right to effect
the withdrawal of life-preserving medical treatment. However, similar
legislation passed in Arkansas was much more sloppily drafted and
simply stated that "all laws or parts of laws in conflict with this Act
are hereby repealed." 63
Other aspects of the Arkansas act show the dangers which can arise
in death with dignity legislation. Section two of the act allows a
person to write a directive rejecting any "artificial, extraordinary,
extreme or radical method or surgical means or procedures calculated
to prolong my life." 64 The act does not limit the situation where treatment may be withdrawn to that of terminal illness, nor does it define
the crucial terms "artificial," "extreme," "extraordinary," or
"radical." Presumably, the courts in Arkansas would not apply this
statute as generally as a first reading of it would appear to allow. Even
greater danger is found in section three of the act, which allows a
parent or guardian to execute such a directive refusing treatment for
anyone, even a minor, who is mentally incapable of executing one, "or
who is otherwise incapacitated." This last phrase is also undefined,
opening the door to unimaginable abuse.
Legislation such as that passed in Arkansas can be assailed as a
denial of the right to life without due process or equal protection of
the laws. It open~ the door to legalized euthanasia which heretofore
has been illegal in every American jurisdiction. This illustrates the
need to examine and monitor carefully any legislation passed in this
area to ensure that necessary safeguards for the patient's most basic
rights remain intact. Death legislation should be effective only in truly
terminal cases; it must not allow the withdrawal of basic nourishment
or sustenance or of ordinary medical means which are beneficial; it
must ensure that consent was given voluntarily to any "living will" or
other consent form; it must prohibit mercy killing and assisted suicide;
and it must not seek mandatory control over a physician's judgment in
some future undeterminable circumstance. Unless care is taken in each
of these areas, such legislation, while intended to assist in the making
of the most difficult of decisions, will only add more burdens to those
faced with these choices, and, even worse, lead to an undermining of
laws protecting the basic rights of patients.

1

5) Legal Consensus on Termination of Treatment Decisions
Despite the uncertainties raised by death with dignity legislation
and some of the court decisions regarding termination of medical
treatment, there is nevertheless an emerging consensus on the legal
principles to be applied in such cases. For the incompetent patient,
the consensus seems to be that medical treatment may be terminated
by a physician when, in his medical judgment, treatment is useless,
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which is to say that it offers no medically reasonable hope of benefit.
In that situation, treatment such as mechanical respiratory assistance,
may be terminated and the patient allowed to die as the natural consequence of the underlying disease process.
A physician is not manda,ted by law to render useless treatment. By
"useless" is meant that the continued use of the therapy cannot and
does not improve the prognosis for recovery. Even if the therapy is
necessary to maintain stability, such therapy should not be mandatory
where the ultimate prognosis is hopeless. This does not mean that
ordinary means of life-support, such as food and drink can be discontinued merely because the ultimate prognosis is hopeless. It does
mean, however, that physicians can exercise sound medical judgment
and common sense in determining whether or not treatment is efficacious and, if it is not, then to cease the treatment. When the patient's
illness is terminal and the end is near, society, through the physician,
should be concerned with easing the difficult burden of death with
loving care and concern, and not with unduly prolonging the
inevitable by officious deathbed burdens such as continued heroic
treatment, living wills or mandatory court approval for decisions that
are best guided by medical judgment.
Likewise, the physician who withdraws treatment from the terminally ill patient for whom death is imminent should not be held
criminally or civilly liable for such conduct, when the "treatment"
merely unduly prolongs the life of the dying patient without holding
out any reasonable hope of benefit. The physician who withdraws or
fails to employ treatment that only briefly forestalls imminent and
inevitable death does not legally cause the death of his patient, since
such conduct merely allows the underlying disease or illness to run its
inevitable course.
We speak here of a limited class of cases, however. First, when
referring to "treatment," we mean a regimen of medi'cal care, as distinguished from ordinary care such as food and drink. Nourishment and
palliative care should be given to all patients, even to those terminally
ill from whom treatment has been withdrawn. Second, when referring
to "useless" treatment or "hopeless" cases, we mean those situations
in which the decision to withdraw treatment is in essence a recognition that nothing more can be done for the patient, that the only
sensible course is to withdraw treatment. The physician cannot be
held liable for death here because he has not caused the patient to die;
he has simply recognized in exercise of sound medical judgment that
death from this disease or condition is inevitable and imminent. A
physician's judgment is not immune from legal intervention, however,
where he has made a decision against treatment, and there does exist
life-prolonging or life-saving treatment. This is the issue presented by
the case of the handicapped infant at risk who requires emergency
surgery or other care to bring it past the crucial neonatal phase. The
May, 1983
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withholding of treatment from such infants is not justified by the
consensus outlined above because such infants are not terminally ill,
only suffering from a life-threatening condition. The judgment to
refrain from correcting the life-threatening condition is not a judgment that death is inevitable, but rather, a judgment that the prospective "quality" of the infant's life is not worth the expense of treatment. The court in Saikewicz specifically rejected "quality of life"
considerations from playing any part in the decision by others to
withdraw treatment from a minor or incompetent person. Thus, the
mercy-killing by omission for "quality of life" reasons, whether of
handicapped infants or senile senior citizens, remains condemned in
American law.
For most cases where termination of treatment is warranted, the
opinions of the courts in Dinnerstein, Brother Fox, and John Storar
are the correct ones. From Dinnerstein, we learn that in the ordinary
and usual case where a patient is dying, the choice of treatment is the
physician's. He does not need court authority to do what he, as a
responsible physician, has been trained to do : make medical judgments. If that judgment is so ill-used as to violate the homicide or tort
laws by abandoning his patient or committing mercy-killing, then the
law remains prepared to deal with those situations, as it should.
From Brother Fox and Storar, we learn that a competent adult has
a common law right of self-determination to refuse medical treatment,
which right does not need to be found in the Constitution, thus
obviating perpetual judicial control of the deathbed. That right of
self-determination, however, does not extend automatically to the
parent or guardian of an incompetent patient. Their role as spouse,
guardian or family does not allow them direction of physicians' treatment, the performance or omission of which might be contrary to law.
The power of self-determination that rests in the individual is never to
be shifted for exercise by proxy through the substituted judgment of
another individual.

1

Conclusion

The law should not seek to control an area as sensitive as the
deathbed by requiring officious and intermeddling standards of legal
conduct before medical judgment can be exercised. Rather, courts and
legislatures exercise their proper function when t hey set the societal
standards, as they have in the cases discussed here . The courts have
properly required that, before treatment may be withdrawn, the
patient must be in a terminal state where death is imminent and there
exists no form of life-satring medical intervention or where the treat-
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ment would only uselessly prolong the dying state without hope of
benefit or recovery .
A court proceeding should only be required where there is a dispute
over whether this standard has been violated . The standard should be
applied equally to all patients, handicapped and nonhandicapped,
infant and aged alike. Resignation to the inevitable death due to
terminal disease, not a conscious decision to kill by means of withholding potentially beneficial or life-saving treatment, is all that has
been authorized by the law. The latter course of mercy-killing remains
condemned, and should be the subject of expedited judicial remedy
where a life hangs in the balance.
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